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Abstract
This paper proposes an integrated approach to indeterminacy and epistemic un-
certainty in order to model an intelligent agent’s decision making about the asserta-
bility of vague statements. Initially, valuation pairs are introduced as a model of
truth-gaps for propositional logic sentences. These take the form of lower and upper
truth-valuations representing absolutely true and not absolutely false respectively. In
particular, we consider valuation pairs based on supervaluationist principles and also
on Kleene’s three valued logic. The relationship between Kleene valuation pairs and
supervaluation pairs is then explored in some detail with particular reference to a
natural ordering on semantic precision. In the second part of the paper we extend this
approach by proposing bipolar belief pairs as an integrated model combining epistemic
uncertainty and indeterminacy. These comprise of lower and upper belief measures on
propositional sentences, defined by a probability distribution on a finite set of possible
valuation pairs. The properties of these measures are investigated together with their
relationship to different types of uncertainty measure. Finally, we apply bipolar belief
measures in a preliminary decision theoretic study so as to begin to understand how
the use of vague expressions can help to mitigate the risk associated with making fore-
casts or promises. This then has potential applications to natural language generation
systems.
Keywords Vagueness, truth-gaps, valuation pairs, semantic uncertainty, integrated
uncertainty, bipolar belief measures.
1 Introduction
A defining feature of vague concepts is that they admit borderline cases which neither
definitely satisfy the concept nor its negation. For example, there are some height values
which would neither be definitely classified as being short nor not short. For propositions
involving vague concepts this naturally results in truth-gaps. In other words, there are
cases in which a proposition is neither absolutely true nor absolutely false. If Ethel’s height
lies in a certain intermediate range then the proposition ‘Ethel is short’ may be inherently
borderline. Such truth-gaps suggests that a non-Tarskian notion of truth may be required
1
to capture this aspect of vagueness even in a simple propositional framework. There has
been a number of different possibilities proposed in the literature for this alternative model
of truth including three valued logics and supervaluations. In the sequel we will discuss
and relate two different models of truth-gaps, supervaluationism and Kleene’s strong three
valued logic, in the context of a new framework for bipolar valuations. In particular, we
will investigate propositional truth-models taking the form of a lower and an upper truth
valuation on the sentences of the language. The underlying idea is that, given such a
valuation pair, the lower truth valuation represents the strong criterion of being absolutely
true, while the upper valuation represents the weaker criterion of being not absolutely false.
In this context, borderline statements are those for which there is a difference between the
lower and upper valuations (i.e. a truth-gap).
A different perspective on borderline cases relates to the notion of assertability. Here
we take the view that concept definitions are to a large extent determined by linguistic
convention, and according to such conventions a statement may or may not be assertable
given a particular state of the world. Interestingly, a case can be made that assertabil-
ity is inherently bipolar, a phenomenon which manifests itself in a distinction between
those propositions which convention would deem definitely assertable, and those which
convention would not classify as incorrect, or perhaps even dishonest, to assert. Parikh
[27] observes that:
Certain sentences are assertible in the sense that we might ourselves assert
them and other cases of sentences which are non-assertible in the sense that
we ourselves (and many others) would reproach someone who used them. But
there will also be the intermediate kind of sentences, where we might allow
their use.
For example, consider a witness in a court of law describing a suspect as being short.
Depending on the actual height of the suspect this statement may be deemed as clearly
true or clearly false, in which latter case the witness could be accused of perjury. However,
there will also be an intermediate height range for which, while there may be doubt and
differing opinions concerning the use of the description short, it would not be deemed as
definitely inappropriate and hence the witness would not be viewed as committing perjury.
In other words, for certain height values of the suspect, it may be acceptable to assert
the statement ‘the suspect was short’, even though this statement would not be viewed as
being absolutely true. Clearly there is a natural connection between this bipolar aspect of
assertability and the idea of truth-gaps for borderline cases outlined above. If a statement
θ is absolutely true, a judgment which is of course dependent both on the state of the
world and on how linguistic convention defines the relevant concepts, then θ would be
definitely assertable. On the other hand, provided that θ is not absolutely false then θ
would be deemed acceptable to assert. The bipolarity of assertability would seem to be
a special case of what Dubois and Prade [7] refer to as symmetric bivariate unipolarity,
whereby judgments are made according to two distinct evaluations on unipolar scales i.e.
distinct evaluations about the assertability of a sentence and its negation. In the current
context, we have a strong and a weak evaluation criterion where the former corresponds
to definite assertability and the latter to acceptable assertability. As with many examples
of this type of bipolarity there is a natural duality between the two evaluation criterion
in that a proposition is definitely assertable if and only if it is not acceptable to assert its
negation.
The adequate representation of epistemic uncertainty is of central importance in any
effective model of belief. Typically we think of uncertainty as arising because of insufficient
information about the state of the world. However, in the presence of vagueness there
may also be semantic uncertainty due to our having only partial knowledge of language
conventions. For example, consider the proposition ‘Ethel is short’. Here an agent with
certain knowledge of Ethel’s height may still be uncertain as to the truth of this proposition
due to uncertainty about the conventions governing the definition of the concept short.
Such uncertainty may naturally arise from the distributed manner in which language is
learnt across a population of communicating agents. Semantic uncertainty often occurs in
conjunction with a lack of knowledge concerning the underlying state of the world. In our
example, the agent may also be uncertain as to the precise value of Ethel’s height. In the
sequel then we propose an integrated model of semantic and stochastic uncertainty in the
context of language conventions which admit borderline cases. Here we view truth as a
function of both the state of the world, e.g. Ethel’s height, and language convention, e.g.
the interpretation of the concept short in terms of height values. An integrated model of
epistemic uncertainty and truth-gaps can then take the form of a probability distribution
on the cross product of the set of possible world states and the set of possible language
conventions. Furthermore, if a convention maps each state of the world to a valuation pair,
then this naturally results in a probability distribution on possible valuation pairs. Given
such a distribution we can immediately define lower and upper measures by evaluating
the probabilities of those valuation pairs in which a given sentence is absolutely true and
of those in which it is not absolutely false respectively. We refer to these lower and upper
measures on the sentences of the language as a bipolar belief pair.
We argue that valuation pairs are one of the most straight-forward representations of
truth-gaps in natural language propositions. Hence, by taking a probability distribution
over a set of possible valuation pairs for the language we generate a very natural integrated
model of belief for propositions and sentences which involve vague concepts and about
which there is inherent uncertainty. As such, the proposed framework provides an ideal
platform from which we can begin to explore issues concerning the utility of vagueness in
communication. Certainly there are many potential applications of such a study including
in natural language generation [39], consensus modelling [24] and multi-agent dialogues
[22]. In this paper we shall focus mainly on the first of these application areas.
A fundamental open problem in natural language generation is that of understanding
why individuals often choose to make vague assertions rather than semantically similar
crisp (non-vague) ones. In particular, what are the practical advantages of such a decision
from the perspective of an asserting agent? One approach is to apply decision theory
so that utility values are associated with different expressions quantifying the benefit or
gain resulting from their assertion given a particular state of the world and in the context
of particular language conventions. Given such a formalism the problem is then that of
understanding why, in certain situations, a vague assertion may result in a higher expected
utility than for a similar crisp assertion. One type of situation where vague assertions may
be preferable in this way, is referred to by van Deemter [39] as future contingencies. Here we
assume that agents are playing what may, to some extent, be seen as a non-cooperative
language game in which different agents have different, and possibly conflicting, goals
and objectives. Within communication environments of this kind there may be a risk
associated with making forecasts or promises which turn out to be wrong or which cannot
be kept. This would then be reflected in the utility values for different assertions within a
particular context. Mitigating this risk is certainly of practical importance is AI systems
such as for automatic weather forecasting or medical diagnosis. In [39] it is suggested
that for predictions or promises vague assertions may be lower risk than crisp ones. In
this paper we shall apply the bipolar belief framework outlined above to carry out a very
preliminary study of future contingencies, from a decision theoretic perspective. The aim
will be to demonstrate the potential of our approach for modelling assertion behaviour,
as well as providing some small insight into how truth-gaps may be exploited so as to
minimize risk and maximize gain in complex multi-agent dialogues.
An outline of the paper is as follows: In following section we describe several approaches
to modelling truth-gaps and emphasise how these differ from theories of epistemic uncer-
tainty. Section 3 then introduces valuation pairs and provides axiomatic characterisations
both of supervaluation pairs and of Kleene valuation pairs. In this section we also in-
vestigate the relationship between Kleene and supervaluation pairs as well as discussing
the functionality and truth-functionality of different classes of valuation pairs. Section 4
proposes bipolar belief measures as an integrated model combining epistemic uncertainty
and truth-gaps. We discuss the motivation and justification for defining lower and upper
belief measures generated from probability distributions on valuation pairs, and investi-
gate the properties of such belief pairs especially relating to a semantic precision ordering
on valuation pairs. This section will also include an exploration of the relationship be-
tween classes of bipolar belief measures and other types of uncertainty measures, such as
possibility measures and interval-valued fuzzy sets. Section 5 outlines a very preliminary
decision theoretic analysis of the use of vague statements in order to mitigate the risk
associated with making predictions or promises. Finally, section 6 gives conclusions and
proposes some future directions of study.
2 Models for Truth Gaps
In this section we outline two general approaches to the modelling of truth-gaps in propo-
sitional logic. The first is that of three-valued logics in which an additional truth-value
is included in the underlying truth-model in order to represent borderline cases. A fully
truth-functional calculus is then defined for the truth values T = {t,b, f} where t denotes
absolutely true, b denotes borderline and f denotes absolutely false. Different logics are
then characterised by different three-valued truth tables for the different connectives. Well
known examples of three-valued logics include Lukasiewicz logic [26] and Kleene’s weak
and strong logics [16]. For example, table 1 show the truth tables for the connectives ¬
(negation), ∧ (conjunction) and ∨ (disjunction) for Kleene’s strong logic.
¬
t f
b b
f t
∧ t b f
t t b f
b b b f
f f f f
∨ t b f
t t t t
b t b b
f t b f
Table 1: Truth tables from Kleene’s strong three-valued logic.
By referring to the middle truth-value as borderline we have consciously adopted some-
what non-standard terminology. Both Lukasiewicz and Kleene use terminology suggestive
of an epistemic interpretation of b corresponding to either possibly true or unknown 1.
This would seem to assume an underlying binary truth-model about which there is only
partial or incomplete knowledge. However, this view is problematic since, as highlighted
by Dubois [6], three-valued logics do not provide an adequate model of ignorance or partial
knowledge. For example, even if there is uncertainty concerning the binary truth-value of
a proposition p then the contradiction p ∧ ¬p would still be known to be false since it is
false in all binary valuations. However, for Kleene’s strong logic we can see from table 1
that if p has the middle truth value then so has p ∧ ¬p.
In contrast to the epistemic view, here we are interested in the application of three-
valued logic to model truth-gaps for propositions involving vague concepts. From this
perspective a proposition may be known to be borderline. For example, given absolute
certainty about Ethel’s height then we may also be certain that the proposition p =‘Ethel
is tall’ is a borderline case. The intermediate truth-value of p results then from the
inherent flexibility in the concept tall and is not the result of a lack of knowledge about any
underlying binary truth-model. Indeed, from this perspective there is no underlying binary
truth-model since truth valuations on vague propositions are inherently three-valued.
1Shapiro [35] uses the term indeterminate which seems closer to our interpretation.
A second model of truth-gaps is supervaluationism as proposed by Fine [10] (see also
Williamson [44] for an exposition)2. In this approach it is assumed that vague concepts
have different admissible precise interpretations referred to as precisifications. For exam-
ple, the concept tall may admit a range of admissible threshold values on height, each
defining a different precisification of the concept. The simplest formulation of superval-
uationism in a propositional logic framework is in terms of a set of admissible classical
(Tarski) valuations. In this case a sentence is said to be supertrue if it is true in every
admissible classical valuation and superfalse if it is false in every admissible valuation (i.e.
its negation is supertrue). Borderline cases are then those sentences which are neither
supertrue nor superfalse. Notice, however, that unlike three-valued logic supervaluation-
ism preserves classical tautologies, contradictions and equivalences. For example, even
though proposition p and its negation ¬p may both be borderline cases, p∨¬p and p∧¬p
are always supertrue and superfalse respectively. Furthermore, if two propositional logic
sentences are classically equivalent then they are either both supertrue, both superfalse or
both borderline.
The relationship between supervaluationism and models of partial or incomplete knowl-
edge is perhaps less straightforward than in the case of three-valued logic. In one sense
there clearly is an underlying binary truth-model since supervaluations are defined in
terms of sets of classical valuations. Indeed, sets of valuations have been proposed as a
way of representing incomplete knowledge of an agent’s beliefs. An example of such a
model would be Boolean (two-valued) possibility theory [9], [3] in which the necessity or
possibility of a sentence is decided on the basis of whether or not it is respectively a direct
consequence of, or consistent with a set of sentences K representing the agent’s incomplete
beliefs about the world. In this context, K can be characterised by the set of valuations
for which every sentence in K is true, and hence a sentence is necessarily true if it is true
in every such valuation and possibly true if it is true in some of these valuations. However,
in supervaluationism we are using sets of valuations in a completely different way so as
to capture vagueness rather than partial knowledge. To explain the difference between
these two distinct uses of sets of valuations we shall employ the notions of conjunctive and
disjunctive sets [42], [5].
A conjunctive set is an inclusive collection of elements representing a conjunctive prop-
erty, whereas a disjunctive set is an exclusive collection of elements each representing one
of a number of possibilities only one of which can actually be realised. For example, the set
of languages spoken by Ethel is a conjunctive set since each element is equally admissible,
while the set {1, . . . , 6} representing the possible outcomes of a throw of a die is a disjunc-
tive set since, while all outcomes are possible, only one outcome can be the actual score.
2The term supervaluationism was originally introduced by van Fraasen [41] with regard to the truth-
gaps which result when some of the terms in a predicate logic language do not have referents in a particular
interpretation.
We argue then that the sets of valuations in supervaluationism are conjunctive, while those
in Boolean possibility theory are disjunctive. More specifically, in supervaluationism a set
of valuations identifies a conjunction of interpretations all of which are admissible precisi-
fications, whereas in Boolean possibility theory the set of valuations correspond to possible
epistemic states, only one of which is the true state of the world. Interestingly, this view
of supervaluationism is what Smith [36] refers to as plurivaluationism, according to which
a language has multiple valid interpretations.
In the following sections we introduce valuation pairs as a general model of truth-gaps
for sentences from a propositional language, and which allows for a unified treatment of
supervaluationism and three-valued logics. Such a treatment will enable us to make a
close comparison between the different truth-models, and here we shall focus in particular
on the relationship between supervaluationism and Kleene’s strong logic.
3 Valuation Pairs
Valuation pairs provide a direct, and relatively straightforward, model of truth-gaps and
indeterminism based on two primitive truth-states; absolutely true and not absolutely false.
These lower and upper truth-states then drive (or are perhaps motivated by) the type of
bipolarity of assertability identified by Parikh [27] as being fundamental to the use of vague
concepts in natural language. In this section we give the general definition of valuation
pairs and identify a number of sub-classes of valuations pairs for further study. Initially,
however, we recall some basic concepts from propositional logic.
Let L be a language of propositional logic with connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬ and a finite set
of propositional variables P = {p1, . . . , pn}. Let SL denote the sentences of L generated
by recursive application of the connectives to P . We also define SL+ as the sentences of L
generated recursively from the propositional variables by application of the connectives ∧
and ∨ only, and similarly we let SL− denote the sentences of L generated recursively from
the negated propositional variables by application of ∧ and ∨ only. Here we can think
of SL+ as the set of entirely positive sentences and SL− as the set of entirely negative
sentences of L respectively.
Classical valuations are based on Tarski’s binary truth-model as follows:
Definition 1. Classical Valuations
A classical valuation v is a function v : SL → {0, 1} satisfying ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL,
• v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
• v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
• v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
A classical valuation is characterised by a subset F ⊆ P so that:
vF (pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F
On the basis of classical valuations we can then define the standard propositional logic
notions of entailment and equivalence according to which θ |= ϕ (ϕ follows from θ) if for all
classical valuations v(θ) = 1 implies that v(ϕ) = 1, and θ ≡ ϕ (θ and ϕ are equivalent) if
for all classical valuations v(θ) = v(ϕ). A sentence θ is then a classical tautology (denoted
|= θ) if v(θ) = 1 in all classical valuations, while θ is a classical contradiction |= ¬θ if
v(θ) = 0 for all classical valuations.
Definition 2. Atoms of L
The atoms of L are those sentences of the form:
α =
n∧
i=1
±pi where + pi denotes the propositional pi and − pi denotes the negated
propositional variable ¬pi
For atom α ∈ SL let Fα = {pi : α |= pi}. Also any subset F ⊆ P characterises an atom
so that:
αF = (
∧
pi∈F
pi) ∧ (
∧
pi 6∈F
¬pi)
By the Disjunctive Normal Form theorem it holds that ∀θ ∈ SL,
θ ≡
∨
F∈Pθ
αF where Pθ = {F : vF (θ) = 1}
Definition 3. Valuation Pairs
A valuation pair is a pair of functions ~v = (v, v) where v : SL → {0, 1} and v : SL →
{0, 1} such that v ≤ v. Furthermore, ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, if v(θ) = v(θ) = α and v(ϕ) = v(ϕ) = β
then v(¬θ) = v(¬θ) = 1− α, v(θ ∧ ϕ) = v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(α, β) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = v(θ ∨ ϕ) =
max(α, β).
Intuitively, v and v are valuation functions for the truth-states absolutely true and not
absolutely false respectively. The requirement that v ≤ v formally defines v as a stronger
criterion than v. Hence, a sentence θ ∈ SL is absolutely true only if it is not absolutely
false. However, the converse does not necessarily hold in which case the difference between
v and v is due to inherent vagueness in the sentences of L. So if v(θ)− v(θ) = 1 then θ is
a borderline case which is neither absolutely true nor absolutely false. In other words, θ is
a sentence which while not definitely assertable is nonetheless acceptable to assert. In the
case that we restrict ourselves to sentences of L which are not viewed as being borderline
it is assumed that valuation pairs behave like classical valuations as given in definition 1.
Indeed, from the perspective of definition 3, classical valuations can be viewed as special
cases of valuation pairs in which v = v.
In the following definition we propose supervaluation pairs as a valuation pair model of
supervaluationism. A supervaluation pair is defined by a set of classical valuations which,
when adopting the set of propositional variables characterisation of classical valuations
outlined above, is represented by a subset P of 2P (i.e. the power set of P ). In this
context v(θ) = 1 if and only if sentence θ is true in every admissible classical valuation in
P, while v(θ) = 1 if and only if θ is true in at least one classical valuation in P. Clearly
then we are identifying the truth-state absolutely true with supertruth and that of not
absolutely false with non-superfalsehood. Upper valuations of the latter kind have been
investigated by Hyde [14] who refers to them as subvaluations.
Definition 4. Supervaluation Pairs
Let ∅ 6= P ⊆ 2P then a supervaluation pair ~v = (v, v) generated by P is given by: ∀θ ∈ SL
v(θ) = min{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} and v(θ) = max{vF (θ) : F ∈ P}
In the sequel we will show that supervaluation pairs retain many of the properties
of classical valuations including classical equivalence, so that if θ ≡ ϕ then ~v(θ) = ~v(ϕ)
for all supervaluation pairs, and classical tautologies, so that if |= θ then ~v(θ) = (1, 1)
for all supervaluation pairs. Furthermore, supervaluation pairs satisfy the natural duality
property that for sentence θ, v(¬θ) = 1 − v(θ) and v(¬θ) = 1 − v(θ). In other words,
a sentence is absolutely true if and only if its negation is absolutely false. An obvious
consequence of this and the fact that supervaluation pairs preserve classical tautologies is
that classical contradictions are also preserved.
A supervaluation pair ~v = (v, v) naturally identifies lower and upper sets of proposi-
tional variables of the form F = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 1} ⊆ F = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 1}. Notice
immediately that for any F ∈ P it must hold that F ⊆ F ⊆ F , however, it does not neces-
sarily follow from definition 4 that either F or F are themselves in P. In the next defini-
tion we identify bounded supervaluation pairs as the class of supervaluation pairs for which
P ⊇ {F , F}. The failure to include F or F in P has the following interesting consequences.
If F 6∈ P then ~v(¬pi) = (0, 1) for pi ∈ F−F while ~v(
∧
pi∈F−F
¬pi) = (0, 0). In other words,
even though the negation of every propositional variable in F −F is a borderline case their
conjunction is absolutely false. Similarly, if F 6∈ P, then ~v(
∧
pi∈F−F
pi) = (0, 0). That is,
the conjunction of all borderline propositional variables in L is absolutely false. Hence,
for bounded supervaluation pairs we are restricting ourselves to sets of admissible classical
valuations which include a valuation in which all borderline propositional variables are
true, and also one in which they are all false.
Definition 5. Bounded Supervaluation Pairs
A bounded supervaluation pair is a supervaluation pair where ∃F , F ∈ P such that F ⊆ F
and ∀F ∈ P, F ⊆ F ⊆ F
Complete bounded supervaluation pairs are a more restricted class of bounded superval-
uation pairs intended to capture the situation in which an agent’s truth-model is generated
solely by them considering propositional variables, and by identifying those propositional
variables which are absolutely true and those which are not absolutely false. The agent
then simply identifies the set of admissible valuations as being all those classical valuations
consistent with these lower and upper valuations of the propositional variables.
Definition 6. Complete Bounded Supervaluation Pairs
A complete bounded supervaluation pair is a bounded supervaluation pair where P = {F :
F ⊆ F ⊆ F}.
An alternative approach to defining valuation pairs is via compositional rules for each
of the connectives. In particular, Kleene valuation pairs are defined in terms of an explicit
duality rule for negation together with min and max combination operators for conjunction
and disjunction respectively. Kleene valuation pairs have already been defined in [23],
where some of their basic properties were described.
Definition 7. Kleene Valuation Pairs
A Kleene valuation pair is a valuation pair ~v = (v, v) such that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL the following
hold:
• v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ) and v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
• v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
• v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
There is a natural link between Kleene valuation pairs and Kleene’s strong three-valued
logic [16]. This can be seen clearly when we view the three possible values of a valuation
pair for a sentence as truth-values i.e. t = (1, 1) as absolutely true, b = (0, 1) as borderline
and f = (0, 0) as absolutely false. If we then view a valuation pair as a function ~v : SL → T
where T = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} then Kleene valuation pairs as given in definition 7, satisfy
the truth-tables for Kleene’s strong three-valued logic as described in section 2, table 1.
In contrast to supervaluation pairs, Kleene valuation pairs do not preserve classical
tautologies and contradictions. Indeed from a well-known property of Kleene’s strong logic
there are no sentences θ for which ~v(θ) = (1, 1) for all Kleene valuation pairs. However,
the laws of excluded middle and non contradiction are at least partially preserved since
θ ∨ ¬θ is not absolutely false and θ ∧ ¬θ is not absolutely true for all Kleene valuation
pairs. Furthermore, Kleene valuation pairs do not preserve all classical equivalences. For
example, consider a Kleene valuation pair for which ~v(p1) = (0, 0) and ~v(p2) = (0, 1).
In this case ~v(p1 ∨ (p2 ∧ ¬p2)) = (0, 1) 6= (0, 0) = ~v(p1). However, a number of classical
equivalences are preserved [23] including, de Morgan’s laws, double negation, idempotence,
commutativity, associativity and distributivity.
Notice, that classical valuation pairs can be viewed as special cases of both Kleene and
supervaluation pairs in which v = v. Of course many other classes of valuation pairs can
also be defined including, for example, valuation pairs related to Lukasiewicz three-valued
logic3. However, for the scope of this paper we will focus on supervaluation pairs and
Kleene valuation pairs, so as to explore the relationship between them. In the following
section we will investigate axiomatic justifications for both these families of valuation pairs
in terms of a set of ‘desirable’ properties for lower and upper valuations. Initially, however,
we introduce notation for sets of valuation pairs of different classes.
Definition 8. Classes of Valuation Pairs
• Let V denote the set of all valuation pairs on L.
• Let Vc denote the set of all classical valuations on L.
• Let Vs denote the set of all supervaluation pairs on L.
• Let Vbs ⊆ Vs denote the set of all bounded supervaluation pairs on L.
• Let Vcbs ⊆ Vbs denote the set of complete bounded supervaluation pairs on L.
• Let Vk denote the set of Kleene valuation pairs on L.
3.1 Axioms for Valuation Pairs
Here we introduce a number of elementary properties which it might be considered desir-
able for a valuation pair to satisfy. The aim is to provide an axiomatic characterisation of
some of the classes of valuation pairs introduced in the previous sub-section, in terms of
a small number of basic requirements for truth-models of indeterminacy.
VP1 (Duality) ∀θ ∈ SL, v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ) and v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ).
VP2 (Tautology Preservation) If |= θ (i.e. θ is a classical tautology) then ~v(θ) = (1, 1).
VP3 (Equivalence) If θ ≡ ϕ (i.e. θ and ϕ are classically equivalent) then ~v(θ) = ~v(ϕ)
VP4 (Maximum Upper) ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
VP5 (Maximum Lower) ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
VP1 is simply the duality property for negation already discussed above, in which
it is required that a sentence is absolutely true if and only if its negation is absolutely
3Lukasiewicz valuation pairs can be defined such that: v(¬θ) = 1 − v(θ) and v(¬θ) = 1 − v(θ),
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∧ ϕ) = max(min(v(θ), v(ϕ)),min(v(θ), v(ϕ))) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) =
min(max(v(θ), v(ϕ)),max(v(θ), v(ϕ))) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
false. VP2 and VP3 require the preservation of classical tautologies and equivalences.
Also, notice that when taken together with VP1, VP2 also implies the preservation of
classical contradictions. The fundamental idea here is that valuation pairs are simply a
generalisation of classical valuations so as to admit indeterminacy, and there is no reason
that such a generalisation should result in a change to the underlying logical equivalences
between sentences of the language. Furthermore, if a sentence is universally true across
all interpretations of the language in which the underlying concepts are assumed to be
crisp, then it should also be absolutely true in any interpretation which admits border-
line cases. This claim has been vigorously contested by proponents of many-valued and
infinitely-valued (fuzzy) logic who argue that there is nothing particularly special about
the tautologies and equivalences of classical logic requiring them to be accorded special
status above those of any other internally consistent logic. Indeed, they argue that admit-
ting additional truth-values fundamentally changes the semantics of the language so that
we should not be surprised if the resulting logic has different tautologies and equivalences.
VP4 requires that a disjunction should be not absolutely false when at least one of its
disjuncts is not absolutely false. Furthermore, this should be the only manner in which
a disjunction is not absolutely false. In other words, a disjunction should be absolutely
false exactly when both of its disjuncts are absolutely false. Together with VP1, VP4
seems perhaps the least controversial of the properties. VP5 again relates to disjunctions
of sentences requiring that a disjunction is absolutely true exactly when at least one of its
disjuncts is absolutely true. However, there is an inherent tension between this requirement
and VP2. To see this suppose that we have a valuation pair for which ~v(p) = (0, 1)
and, as would be required by VP1, also ~v(¬p) = (0, 1). If in this case VP5 holds then
v(p∨¬p) = 0 contradicting VP2. Notice there is no problem here with the requirement that
a disjunction with at least one absolutely true disjunct is itself absolutely true, but rather
with the requirement that this is the only way in which a disjunction can be absolutely
true. In other words, there is no tension between VP2 and the weaker requirement that
v(θ ∨ ϕ) ≥ max(v(θ), v(ϕ)). Finally, notice that assuming VP1 holds together with de
Morgan’s laws then VP4 and VP5 imply dual constraints on conjunctions of the form
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) respectively.
The following results show that VP1 through to VP4 provide a characterisation of
supervaluation pairs.
Theorem 9. If ~v ∈ V satisfies axioms VP1 through to VP4 then ∃∅ 6= P ⊆ 2P such
that ∀θ ∈ SL, v(θ) = min{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} and v(θ) = max{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} i.e. ~v is a
supervaluation pair.
Proof. Let P = {Fαj : v(αj) = 1}. Notice that P 6= ∅ since if P = ∅ then by the definition
of P we have that ∀αj , v(αj) = 0⇒ by definition of valuation pairs v(αj) = 0. Therefore,
by VP1 we for any atom αj that v(¬αj) = 1. However, ¬αj ≡
∨
k 6=j αk and therefore by
VP3 and VP4 we have that
v(¬αj) = v(
∨
k 6=j
αk) = max{v(αk) : k 6= j} = 0
This is a contradiction.
Now suppose θ is a tautology then by VP2 it holds that ~v(θ) = (1, 1). Also ∀F ⊆ P
it holds that vF (θ) = 1. Therefore, min{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} = max{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} = 1 as
required. Now suppose θ is not a tautology so that Pθ 6= ∅ and P¬θ 6= ∅. We consider
three cases:
~v(θ) = (0, 0)
~v(θ) = (0, 0)⇒ ( by VP3 ) ~v(
∨
F∈Pθ
αF ) = (0, 0)⇒ v(
∨
F∈Pθ
αF ) = 0
⇒ ( by VP4 ) max{v(αF ) : F ∈ Pθ} = 0⇒ ∀F ∈ Pθ, v(αF ) = 0
and hence by definition of P it follows that Pθ ∩ P = ∅ ⇒ ∀F ∈ P, vF (θ) = 0
⇒ min{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} = max{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} = 0
as required.
~v(θ) = (0, 1)
Suppose that ∀F ∈ P vF (θ) = 1 ⇒ P ⊆ Pθ ⇒ ∀F ∈ P
c
θ(= P¬θ), v(αF ) = 0 (by the
definition of P). Now by VP3 and VP4
v(¬θ) = v(
∨
F∈P¬θ
αF ) = max{v(αF ) : F ∈ P¬θ} = 0⇒ v(θ) = 1 by axiom VP1
This a contradiction and hence ∃F ∈ P, vF (θ) = 0⇒ min{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} = 0 as required.
Alternatively suppose that ∀F ∈ P, vF (θ) = 0 ⇒ ∀F ∈ P, vF (¬θ) = 1 ⇒ P ⊆ P¬θ ⇒
∀F ∈ Pθ, v(αF ) = 0 by definition of P. Now by VP3 and VP4
v(θ) = v(
∨
F∈Pθ
αF ) = max{v(αF ) : F ∈ Pθ} = 0
This is a contradiction and therefore ∃F ∈ P, vF (θ) = 1 ⇒ max{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} = 1 as
required.
~v(θ) = (1, 1)
Suppose ∃F ∈ P such that vF (θ) = 0 ⇒ ∃F ∈ P such that αF 6|= θ (i.e. F ∈ P¬θ) ⇒
∃F ∈ P ∩ P¬θ ⇒ by the definition of P that ∃F ∈ P¬θ such that v(αF ) = 1 ⇒ by VP3
and VP4 that
v(¬θ) = max{v(αF ) : F ∈ P¬θ)} = 1
⇒ v(θ) = 0 by VP1 which is a contradiction. Hence ∀F ∈ P, vF (θ) = 1 ⇒
min{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} = max{vF (θ) : F ∈ P} = 1
as required.
Corollary 10. A valuation pair ~v satisfies VP1 to VP4 if and only if ~v is a supervaluation
pair
Proof. From theorem 9 it only remains to show that supervaluation pairs satisfy VP1 to
VP4. This follows trivially from the definition of supervaluation pairs.
From our earlier discussions it is clear that supervaluation pairs do not, in general,
satisfy VP5. This is because they do satisfy VP2 and that there are clearly examples of
supervaluation pairs for which ~v(p) = ~v(¬p) = (0, 1) for some propositional variable p (e.g.
take P = {{p}, ∅}).
In the following results we show that, taken together with de Morgan’s laws, VP1,
VP4 and VP5 provide a characterisation of Kleene valuation pairs.
Theorem 11. If ~v ∈ V satisfies VP1, VP4, VP5 and de Morgan’s laws then ~v is a Kleene
valuation pair.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∧ ϕ) =
min(v(θ), v(ϕ)). By VP1 v(θ∧ϕ) = 1−v(¬(θ∧ϕ)) = 1−v(¬θ∨¬ϕ) by de Morgan’s laws
= 1−max(v(¬θ), v(¬ϕ)) by VP5 = 1−max(1−v(θ), 1−v(ϕ)) by VP1 = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
The result for v(θ ∧ ϕ) follows similarly.
Corollary 12. A valuation pair ~v ∈ V satisfies VP1, VP4, VP5 and de Morgan’s laws if
and only if ~v is a Kleene valuation pair.
Proof. From theorem 11 and definition 7 we need only show that Kleene valuation pairs
satisfy de Morgan’s laws. This is proved in [23].
We now define semantic precision as a natural partial ordering on V. This concerns
the situation in which one valuation pairs admits more borderline cases than another but
where otherwise their truth valuations agree. More formally, valuation pair ~v1 is less
semantically precise than ~v2 if they disagree only for some set of sentences of L, which
being identified as either absolutely true or absolutely false by ~v2, are classified as being
borderline cases by ~v1. In other words, ~v1 is less semantically precise than ~v2 if all of the
absolutely true and absolutely false valuations of ~v1 are preserved by ~v2.
Definition 13. Semantic Precision
∀~v1, ~v2 ∈ V, ~v1  ~v2 if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL, v1(θ) ≤ v2(θ) and v1(θ) ≥ v2(θ).
We might now think of the disagreement between two valuation pairs related by 
as intuitively being less than that of two unrelated valuation pairs. Indeed, if ~v1  ~v2
then another perspective is to think of ~v2 being generated as a precisification (in the
general sense) of ~v1 by, perhaps even arbitrarily, classifying some of the borderline cases
identified by ~v1 as either being absolutely true or absolutely false. The following two
results show alternative characterisations of semantic precision both for Kleene valuation
pairs and supervaluation pairs. In the latter case notice that ~v1  ~v2 exactly when the
first interpretation is a precisification of the second in the sense of Fine [10]. Indeed,
Shapiro [35] proposes a version of this ordering for Kleene’s strong logic which be refers
to as sharpening, where ~v1  ~v2 means that ~v2 extends or sharpens ~v1.
Theorem 14. [23] ∀~v1, ~v2 ∈ Vk, ~v1  ~v2 if and only if {pi ∈ P : v1(pi) = 1} ⊆ {pi ∈ P :
v2(pi) = 1} and {pi ∈ P : v1(pi) = 1} ⊇ {pi ∈ P : v2(pi) = 1}.
Theorem 15. ∀~v1, ~v2 ∈ Vs, ~v1  ~v2 if and only if P1 ⊇ P2 where P1 and P2 are the sets
of admissible valuations for ~v1 and ~v2 respectively.
For theorem 14 the proof follows trivially by induction on the complexity of sentences
in SL, while theorem 15 follows immediately from the definition of supervaluation pairs.
3.2 Relating Kleene and Supervaluation Pairs
In this section we investigate the relationship between Kleene valuation pairs and bounded
supervaluation pairs. In particular, we will show that for every bounded supervaluation
pair there is a less semantically precise Kleene valuation pair with the same values on
the sets of entirely positive and entirely negative sentences of L. The following two ini-
tial lemmas prove useful nestedness properties for classical valuations when restricted to
sentences in SL+ and SL−.
Lemma 16. If θ ∈ SL+ and F ⊆ F ′ ⊆ P then vF (θ) = 1 implies that vF ′(θ) = 1
Proof. Let SL+,0 = P and SL+,n = SL+,n−1 ∪ {θ ∧ ϕ, θ ∨ ϕ : θ, ϕ ∈ SL+,n−1}. Then by
induction on n.
For pi ∈ P , vF (pi) = 1 ⇒ pi ∈ F ⇒ pi ∈ F
′ ⇒ vF ′(pi) = 1. Now suppose Ψ ∈ SL
+,n+1
then either Ψ ∈ SL+,n in which case the result follows trivially or ∃θ, ϕ ∈ SL+,n and one
of the following holds:
• Ψ = θ∧ϕ: In this case vF (θ∧ϕ) = 1⇒ vF (θ) = 1 and vF (ϕ) = 1⇒ (By induction)
vF ′(θ) = 1 and vF ′(ϕ) = 1 ⇒ vF ′(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 as required.
• Ψ = θ ∨ ϕ: In this case vF (θ ∨ ϕ) = 1⇒ vF (θ) = 1 or vF (ϕ) = 1 ⇒ (By induction)
vF ′(θ) = 1 or vF ′(ϕ) = 1 ⇒ vF ′(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 as required.
Lemma 17. If θ ∈ SL− and F ′ ⊆ F ⊆ P then vF (θ) = 1 implies that vF ′(θ) = 1
Proof. The proof mirrors that of lemma 16 but with induction on the complexity of sen-
tences in SL− instead of SL+.
The next result shows that for any bounded supervaluation pair its value on strictly
positive or strictly negative sentences is determined entirely from its lower and upper
admissible valuations. In other words, it has the same value on SL+∪SL− as the bounded
supervaluation pair which admits only these lower and upper valuations.
Theorem 18. Let ~v ∈ Vbs be a bounded supervaluation pair with lower and upper admissi-
ble valuations F and F and let ~v′ be the bounded supervaluation pair for which P ′ = {F , F}
then ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL−, ~v(θ) = ~v′(θ)
Proof. For θ ∈ SL+: If v(θ) = 1 ⇒ ∃F ∈ P such that vF (θ) = 1 ⇒ vF (θ) = 1 by lemma
16⇒ v′(θ) = 1. Also, if v′(θ) = 1⇒ vF (θ) = 1⇒ ∃F ∈ P such that vF (θ) = 1⇒ v(θ) = 1
If v(θ) = 1 ⇒ ∀F ∈ P, vF (θ) = 1 ⇒ vF (θ) = 1 and vF (θ) = 1 ⇒ v
′(θ) = 1. Also, if
v′(θ) = 1 ⇒ vF (θ) = 1 ⇒ by lemma 16 ∀F ∈ P, vF (θ) = 1 ⇒ v(θ) = 1
For θ ∈ SL− the result follows similarly from lemma 17 by swapping the roles of F
and F in the above argument.
Notice, however, it is not generally the case that for θ ∈ SL−(SL+∪SL−), ~v(θ) = ~v′(θ)
as can be seen from the following example:
Example 19. Let P = {{p1}, {p1, p2}, {p1, p2, p3}} so that P
′ = {{p1}, {p1, p2, p3}}. In
this case v(p2 ∧ ¬p3) = 1 while v
′(p2 ∧ ¬p3) = 0
We now show that for entirely positive and entirely negative sentences, bounded su-
pervaluation pairs satisfy property VP5 i.e. that a disjunction is absolutely true exactly
when at least one of its disjuncts is absolutely true. Furthermore, in this case we also
have the dual result that a conjunction is not absolutely false exactly when both of its
conjuncts are not absolutely false.
Theorem 20. Let ~v ∈ Vbs be a bounded supervaluation pair then ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL
+ and
∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL− it holds that:
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
Proof. As before let P ′ = {F , F} then for θ, ϕ ∈ SL+, v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 iff v′(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 by
theorem 18 iff vF (θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 by lemma 16 iff vF (θ) = 1 and vF (ϕ) = 1 iff v
′(θ) = 1 and
v′(ϕ) = 1 by lemma 16 iff v(θ) = 1 and v(ϕ) = 1 by theorem 18 as required.
Similarly, v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 iff v′(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 by theorem 18, iff vF (θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 by lemma 16
iff vF (θ) = 1 or vF (ϕ) = 1 iff v
′(θ) = 1 or v′(ϕ) = 1 by lemma 16 iff v(θ) = 1 or v(ϕ) = 1
by theorem 18 as required.
For θ, ϕ ∈ SL− the result follows similarly from lemma 17 by swapping the roles of F
and F in the above argument.
Theorem 21. Let ~vbs ∈ Vbs be a bounded supervaluation pair then there exists a unique
Kleene valuation pair ~vk such that ~vk  ~vbs and ∀θ ∈ SL
+ ∪ SL−, ~vk(θ) = ~vbs(θ).
Proof. We define ~vk ∈ Vk such that ∀pi ∈ P let vk(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F and vk(pi) = 1 iff
pi ∈ F , where F and F are the lower and upper sets of admissible valuations for ~vbs.
Firstly, we show that ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL−, ~vk(θ) = ~vbs(θ). Here we prove this result for
sentences in SL+, and the result for SL− follows similarly. The proof is by induction as
follows. For pi ∈ P the result follows trivially. Now suppose Ψ ∈ SL
+,n+1 then either
Ψ ∈ SL+,n in which case the result follows trivially or ∃θ, ϕ ∈ SL+,n and one of the
following holds:
• Ψ = θ ∧ ϕ: vk(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by definition of Kleene valuation pairs
= min(vbs(θ), vbs(ϕ)) by the inductive hypothesis = vbs(θ ∧ ϕ) by a basic property
of supervaluation pairs. Also, vk(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by definition of Kleene
valuation pairs = min(vbs(θ), vbs(ϕ)) by the inductive hypothesis = vbs(θ ∧ ϕ) by
theorem 20.
• Ψ = θ ∨ ϕ : vk(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by definition of Kleene valuation
pairs = max(vbs(θ), vbs(ϕ)) by the inductive hypothesis = vbs(θ ∨ ϕ) by theorem
20. Also, vk(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by definition of Kleene valuation pairs
= max(vbs(θ), vbs(ϕ)) by the inductive hypothesis = vbs(θ ∨ ϕ) by a basic property
of supervaluation pairs.
To see that ~vk defined as above is the only Kleene valuation agreeing with ~vbs for all
sentences in SL+∪SL− note that if ∀pi ∈ P , ~vk(pi) = ~vbs(pi) then vk(pi) = 1 iff vbs(pi) = 1
iff pi ∈ F and vk(pi) = 1 iff vbs(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F .
We now show that ~vk  ~vbs, for ~vk defined as above. The proof is by induction as
follows: If Ψ ∈ SL0 then Ψ = pi ∈ P . Clearly, by the definition of ~vk, ~vk(pi) = ~vbs(pi) and
so the result follows trivially in this case. Now suppose Ψ ∈ SLn+1 then either Ψ ∈ SLn
in which case the result follows trivially or ∃θ, ϕ ∈ SLn such that one of the following
holds:
• Ψ = θ ∧ ϕ: In this case, if vk(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 then min(vk(θ), vk(θ)) = 1 which implies
that vk(θ) = 1 and vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence, by induction, vbs(θ) = 1 and vbs(ϕ) = 1
which implies that vbs(θ∧ϕ) = 1 as required. Also, if vbs(θ∧ϕ) = 1 then vbs(θ) = 1
and vbs(ϕ) = 1 which implies, by induction, that vk(θ) = 1 and vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence,
min(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) = vk(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 as required.
• Ψ = θ ∨ ϕ: In this case, if vk(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 then max(vk(θ), vk(θ)) = 1 which implies
that vk(θ) = 1 or vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence, by induction, vbs(θ) = 1 or vbs(ϕ) = 1 which
implies that vbs(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 as required. Also, if vbs(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 then vbs(θ) = 1
or vbs(ϕ) = 1 which implies, by induction, that vk(θ) = 1 or vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence,
max(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) = vk(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 as required.
• Ψ = ¬θ: In this case, if vk(¬θ) = 1 then vk(θ) = 0, which implies, by induction,
that vbs(θ) = 0. Hence, vbs(¬θ) = 1 as required. Also, if vbs(¬θ) = 1 then vbs(θ) = 0
which implies, by induction, that vk(θ) = 0. Hence, vk(¬θ) = 1 as required.
There are a number of different possible viewpoints from which we can interpret the-
orem 21. One perspective might be that in some sense bounded supervaluation pairs
provide a better model of truth-gaps than Kleene valuation pairs, perhaps on the basis of
the axiomatic characterisations given in section 3.1. In this case we could view the Kleene
valuation pair ~vk identified in theorem 21 as a less semantically precise approximation
of ~vbs, agreeing with ~vbs on an important subclass of sentences. Such an approxima-
tion might be advantageous on computational grounds because Kleene valuation pairs are
truth-functional, while bounded supervaluation pairs are not even functional in a weaker
sense. We will consider this issue in more detail in the following section.
An alternative perspective would be to simply view Kleene valuation pair ~vk as a more
vague interpretation of L for which theorem 21 identifies a set of bounded supervaluation
pairs as different precisifications. More formally, given Kleene valuation pair ~vk ∈ Vk for
which F = {pi : vk(pi) = 1} and F = {pi : vk(pi) = 1} then we can identify the class of
bounded supervaluation pairs with lower and upper admissible valuations F and F , given
by:
JF , F K = {~vbs ∈ Vbs : {pi : vbs(pi) = 1} = F , {pi : vbs(pi) = 1} = F}
Now theorem 21 identifies the same Kleene valuation pair ~vk for each bounded supervalu-
ation pair in JF , F K. Hence, we might think of JF , F K as a natural class of precisifications
of ~vk.
Interestingly, the class JF , F K also provides us with some insight into the relationship
between bounded supervaluation pairs and complete bounded supervaluation pairs. Notice
that as F ⊆ F range across all possible such pairs of subsets of P , then the sets JF , F K
form a partition of Vbs. Also, each complete bounded supervaluation pair ~vcbs ∈ Vcbs is
a member of exactly one of these sets. In fact, if ~vcbs has lower and upper admissible
valuations F and F then ~vcbs ∈ JF , F K and by theorem 15 ∀~vbs ∈ JF , F K, ~vcbs  ~vbs.
Hence, ∀θ ∈ SL,
vcbs(θ) = min{vbs(θ) : ~vbs ∈ JF , F K} and vcbs(θ) = max{vbs(θ) : ~vbs ∈ JF , F K}
Also notice by theorem 18 that ~vcbs agrees with all the valuation pairs in JF , F K on the
sentences in SL+ ∪ SL−. Hence, in summary, we have that for every partition set of
bounded supervaluation pairs JF , F K there is both a unique Kleene valuation pair and
a unique complete bounded supervaluation pair which are less semantically precise than
all the valuation pairs in this set, but which agree with all of them on the sentences of
SL+ ∪ SL−.
In the following section we consider the representational power of supervaluation pairs,
bounded and complete bounded supervaluation pairs, and Kleene valuation pairs, with
particular regard to penumbral connections.
3.3 Penumbral Connections
Fine [10] highlights the capacity to capture penumbral connections as a significant advan-
tage of supervaluationist theories of vagueness over many-valued logics. Penumbral con-
nections are defined to be those ‘logical relations [that] hold between indefinite sentences’
[10]. In particular, given a set of borderline literals, penumbral connections may ensure
that certain conjunctions or disjunctions of these literals are nonetheless absolutely true or
absolutely false. For example, suppose we have a sequence of heights h1 < h2 < . . . < hn
where only h1 is classed as being absolutely not tall, and only hn is absolutely tall, so that
all other heights are borderline cases of tall. However, despite their borderline status, if we
were to learn that hi was indeed tall for any i ∈ {2, . . . , n−1} we would immediately infer
that hi+1 was also tall, simply because hi+1 > hi. More formally, let pi denote the proposi-
tion ‘a person of height hi is tall’ then we can capture the above penumbral connections by
the supervaluation pair where P = {{p2, . . . , pn}, . . . , {pi, . . . , pn}, . . . , {pn−1, pn}, {pn}}.
In this case, ~v(p1) = (0, 0), ~v(pn) = (1, 1) and ~v(pi) = (0, 1) for i = 2, . . . , n − 1. Fur-
thermore, ~v(pi → pi+1) = (1, 1)
4 for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Notice that this is a bounded
supervaluation pair with F = {pn} and F = {p2, . . . , pn} but it is not a complete bounded
supervaluation pair. Indeed, the complete bounded supervaluation pair generated by F
and F as above, would loose the semantic information about the penumbral connections
between p1, . . . , pn since it would, by definition, contain other admissible valuations con-
sistent with pi ∧ ¬pj for j > i.
Another type of penumbral connections concerns two propositional variables which
are exclusive and exhaustive, but where both are borderline cases. Fine [10] uses the
example of colours red and pink, suggesting that a given object on the borderline of these
two colours must nonetheless be described as one or the other but not both. Suppose
then that we have two borderline propositions p1 and p2, for which p1 ∧ p2 is absolutely
false and p1 ∨ p2 is absolutely true. In order for a supervaluation pair to capture this
semantic information we would require the following; 1) ∀F ∈ P either p1 ∈ F or p2 ∈ F
4Here pi → pj is used as shorthand for ¬pi ∨ pj .
but {p1, p2} 6⊆ F , and 2) ∃F, F
′ ∈ P such that p1 ∈ F and p2 ∈ F
′. However, a set of
admissible valuations with these properties cannot define a bounded supervaluation pair.
To see this notice that taking F = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 1}, it follows that {p1, p2} ⊆ F and
therefore F 6∈ P.
The above examples provide some illustration of the loss of representational power
resulting from restricting general supervaluation pairs to either bounded or complete
bounded supervaluation pairs. Whilst corollary 10 means that any penumbral connec-
tions resulting from classical equivalences, tautologies or contradictions can be captured
by all supervaluation pairs, restricting ourselves to bounded and then complete bounded
supervaluation pairs successively limits the type of penumbral connections which can
be captured. Kleene valuation pairs have even less capacity for representing the type
of penumbral connections we have outlined here. Indeed, even connections represented
by classical equivalences, tautologies and contradictions cannot in general be captured.
For example, there is no Kleene valuation pair where ~v(θ) = ~v(¬θ) = (0, 1) but where
~v(θ ∧ ¬θ) = (0, 0) and ~v(θ ∨ ¬θ) = (1, 1). In the next section, however, we will argue
that, despite the reduction in capacity for representing penumbral connections, there are
some computational advantage of restricting ourselves to bounded or complete bounded
supervaluation pairs, or indeed even to Kleene valuation pairs
3.4 Functionality and Truth-Functionality of Valuation Pairs
Truth-functionality or compositionality is a fundamental aspect of most classical formal
systems. The truth value of any compound expression, it is assumed, can be determined
from the truth-values of its components by means of a recursive process dependent of
the logical structure of that expression. This provides a computationally feasible method
for determining truth-values with a computational cost bounded by the number of inde-
pendent occurrences of connectives in the given formula. Furthermore, an agent is only
required to identify truth-values for the primitives in the language; in this case the propo-
sitional variables.
In this section we consider the issue of truth-functionality for valuation pairs together
with a weaker form of functionality. For the latter, rather than assuming that valuations
are determined from mappings based directly around the connectives of the language,
we require only that, for each sentence θ, a function can be identified which determines
the valuation of θ on the basis of the valuations for the propositional variables only.
Such an assumption restricts the necessity of direct truth evaluations to the propositional
variables which can at least potentially limit an agent’s storage (or memory) requirements.
However, as we shall see the computational cost of evaluating a sentence can, in the worst
case, remain high.
The following are formal definitions of both functionality and truth-functionality for a
class V′ ⊆ V of valuation pairs.
Definition 22. Functionality
Let T = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. Then a class of valuation pairs V′ ⊆ V is functional if
∀θ ∈ SL there exists a function fθ : T
n → T such that:
∀~v ∈ V′, ~v(θ) = fθ(~v(p1), . . . , ~v(pn))
Definition 23. Truth-Functionality
A class of valuation pairs V′ ⊆ V is truth-functional if there are functions f∧ : T
2 → T,
f∨ : T
2 → T and f¬ : T → T such that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL and ∀~v ∈ V
′:
~v(¬θ) = f¬(~v(θ)), ~v(θ ∧ ϕ) = f∧(~v(θ), ~v(ϕ)), and ~v(θ ∨ ϕ) = f∨(~v(θ), ~v(ϕ))
Naturally any class of valuation pairs which are truth-functional are also functional.
For example, Kleene valuation pairs are truth-functional. However, the following example
shows that in general supervaluation pairs are not functional.
Example 24. Let P = {p1, p2, p3} and ~v1 and ~v2 be supervaluation pairs with sets of
admissible valuations P1 = {{p1}, {p2}, {p3}} and P2 = {{p1, p2}, {p3}} respectively. Now
for both ~v1 and ~v2 we have that ~v1(p1) = ~v2(p1) = (0, 1), ~v1(p2) = ~v2(p2) = (0, 1) and
~v1(p3) = ~v2(p3) = (0, 1). But ~v1(p1 ∧ p2) = (0, 0) while ~v2(p1 ∧ p2) = (0, 1).
In fact it is not even the case that the restricted class of bounded supervaluation pairs
are functional as can be seen from the following example:
Example 25. Let P = {p1, p2, p3} and ~v1 and ~v2 be bounded supervaluation pairs with sets
of admissible valuations P1 = {{p1}, {p1, p2}, {p1, p2, p3}} and P2 = {{p1}, {p1, p3}, {p1, p2, p3}}
respectively. For both ~v1 and ~v2 we have that ~v1(p1) = ~v2(p1) = (1, 1), ~v1(p2) = ~v2(p2) =
(0, 1) and ~v1(p3) = ~v2(p3) = (0, 1). However, for θ = p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ¬p3 we have that
~v1(θ) = (0, 1) while ~v2(θ) = (0, 0).
On the other hand, complete bounded supervaluation pairs are functional as we can
see from the following argument: If ~v ∈ Vcbs then if we know ~v(pi) for i = 1, . . . , n then
we can determine the lower and upper admissible valuations according to:
F = {pi : v(pi) = 1} and F = {pi : v(pi) = 1}
and consequently we can define for any θ ∈ SL, fθ : T
n → T such that:
fθ(~v(p1), . . . , ~v(pn)) = (min{vF (θ) : F ⊆ F ⊆ F},max{vF (θ) : F ⊆ F ⊆ F})
However, as the next result shows, no class of supervaluation pairs which strictly extends
classical valuations is truth-functional.
Theorem 26. Let Vc ⊂ V
′ ⊆ Vs then the class of supervaluation pairs V
′ is not truth-
functional.
Proof. Since V′ ⊃ Vc then there exists ~v ∈ V
′ with admissible valuations P ⊇ {F, F ′}
where F 6= F ′. Now w.l.o.g we can assume that ∃pi ∈ F such that pi 6∈ F
′. Hence,
~v(pi) = (0, 1), ~v(¬pi) = (0, 1) but ~v(pi ∧ pi) = (0, 1) while ~v(pi ∧ ¬pi) = (0, 0). Hence, V
′
is not truth-functional.
Given all of the above we can now consider the computational cost of truth evaluations
for different classes of valuation pairs, from the perspective of the functionality and truth-
functionality properties. If a sentence θ has m distinct occurrences of the connectives then
for any truth-functional class V′ the computational cost of evaluating ~v(θ) is O(m) 5. For
non truth-functional V′ this cost can be much higher. For example, if ~v ∈ Vs then the cost
of evaluating ~v(θ) is, in the worst case, O(m|P|) i.e. the combined cost of evaluating the
truth value of θ for every admissible classical valuation in P.6 Indeed, this is also true for
complete bounded supervaluation pairs, even though their functionality means that P does
not need to be stored directly but can be determined from the valuations on propositional
variables. However, these are worst case costs and in many situations evaluating valuation
pairs can be much more computationally feasible. For instance, notice that from theorem
20 it follows that for sentences restricted to SL+ or SL− bounded supervaluation pairs
are effectively truth-functional with f∧ = min and f∨ = max. Also, recall from theorem
21 that any bounded supervaluation pair can be ‘approximated’ by a semantically less
precise but fully truth-functional Kleene valuation pair.
4 Bipolar Belief Measures
Recall, as discussed in section 2, that there is a clear distinction between indeterminism
and epistemic uncertainty. For vague concepts, truth-gaps are an integral part of the
underlying truth-model and do not result from lack of knowledge about any of the relevant
attributes involved in the concept definitions. In particular, borderline cases do not model
uncertainty, and indeed an agent can be certain that a particular proposition is a borderline
case. For example, a given height may definitely be a borderline case of the predicate
tall. Similarly, learning that the proposition ‘Bill is tall’ is borderline is informative since
it suggests that Bill’s height is a borderline case of the concept tall and hence provides
information about its actual value. On the other hand, learning that the truth-value of ‘Bill
is tall’ is uncertain or unknown provides no information about Bill’s height. Hence, from
5This is of course assuming no cost for evaluating the connective functions f¬, f∧ and f∨
6This worst case occurs when determining the valuation pair values of a sentence θ which is either
absolutely true or absolutely false. In such a case the truth value of θ must be calculated for every
admissible valuation in P, with a cost for each valuation dependent on the number of connectives in θ.
this perspective, valuation pairs provide a truth-model incorporating truth-gaps and not a
three-valued representation of uncertainty. This is in contrast to a significant proportion
of the literature on three-valued logic which tends to use the third truth-value to represent
‘unknown’ [6].
In view of the above distinction, it is natural to propose a combined model incor-
porating both indeterminism and epistemic uncertainty in order to represent an agent’s
subjective beliefs concerning sentences which involve vague concepts. In the sequel we
will argue that this model should be characterised by a probability distribution over a
set of possible valuations. This will then result in lower and upper (bipolar) measures
of subjective belief on the sentences of L, as outlined below. Now, in practice, there are
many different sources of epistemic uncertainty that will influence an agent’s belief about
SL. However, here we suggest that one natural division of uncertainty types is as follows:
• Semantic Uncertainty : This takes the form of uncertainty about the linguistic con-
ventions governing the assertability of sentences of L. In other words, uncertainty
about what is the correct interpretation of L. For example, an agent may be uncer-
tain as to whether or not a proposition such as ‘Ethel is tall’ is definitely or acceptably
assertable even if they know Ethel’s height precisely. One would expect this type of
uncertainty to be a natural consequence of the distributed manner in which an agent
learns language through communications with other individuals across a population
of interacting agents.
• Possible Worlds Uncertainty : This type of uncertainty arises from a lack of knowl-
edge concerning the current state of the world and in particular about the referents
of sentences in L. For example, an agent may not know Ethel’s height precisely and
hence be uncertain about the truth value of the proposition ‘Ethel is tall’. Another
way of viewing this is that the agent has identified a set of possible worlds, perhaps
corresponding to different possible values for Ethel’s height, but where he/she is
uncertain as to which of these correspond to the actual world.
The second of these uncertainty types would seem to be consistent with the conventional
understanding of epistemic uncertainty. In contrast, the treatment of semantic uncertainty
as a form of epistemic uncertainty perhaps requires some justification. In our view semantic
uncertainty is another important aspect of vagueness in language, but one which is best
understood in terms of a lack of knowledge concerning the underlying conventions of the
language. By adopting this view we are, in effect, assuming that each agent believes in
the existence of a coherent set of rules governing the assertability of the sentences of L,
which they should adhere to in order to communicate effectively with other agents. In
other words, agents make the assumption that there is a correct interpretation of the
language L7. This would seem to bring us close to the epistemic theory of vagueness as
7although there is no requirement that this should be a classical interpretation
expounded by Timothy Williamson [44]. The epistemic theory of vagueness assumes that
for the extension of a vague concept there is a precise but unknown dividing boundary
between it and the extension of its negation. For example, consider the set of heights
which are classified as being tall, then according to the epistemic theory there is a precise
but unknown height threshold ǫ for which all heights less than ǫ are not tall and all those
greater than or equal to ǫ are tall.
While there are marked similarities between the epistemic theory of vagueness and the
notion of semantic uncertainty outlined above, there are also some important differences.
In the first instance the epistemic view assumes that the underlying interpretation of
the language is classical, while in the sequel we will assume that it may admit truth-
gaps by, for example, taking the form of a valuation pair. Perhaps more importantly
though, the epistemic theory would seem to assume the existence of some objectively
correct interpretation of L which is not necessarily correlated with language use.8 Instead,
we adopt the more pragmatic view that individuals, when faced with decision problems
about assertions, find it useful as part of decision making strategy to simply assume that
there is a correct interpretation of L. In other words, when deciding what can be asserted
agents behave as if the epistemic theory is correct. In earlier work we have referred to this
strategic assumption across a population of agents as the epistemic stance [19], a concise
statement of which is as follows:
Each individual agent in the population assumes the existence of a correct set
of language conventions, governing what can appropriately (or truthfully) be
asserted given a particular state of the world.
Of course, in practice such conventions would not be imposed by some outside authority.
Indeed, they may not exist at all in a single centralised form. Rather they are represented
as a distributed body of knowledge concerning the interpretation of concepts in various
cases, shared across a population of agents, and emerging as the result of interactions
and communications between individual agents all adopting the epistemic stance. The
idea is that the learning processes of individual agents, all sharing the fundamental aim
of understanding how words can be appropriately used to communicate information, will
eventually converge to some degree on a set of shared conventions.9 The very process of
convergence would then to some extent vindicate the epistemic stance from the perspective
of individual agents.
8While this is true of the epistemic theory in general, it is perhaps worth noting that Williamson does
assume that the correctness of one particular interpretation is determined by the usage of speakers. Many
thanks to one of the anonymous referees for this observation.
9This kind of convergent process has been shown to take place in various agent-based simulations of
language games. See, for example, Steels and Belpaeme [37].
4.1 An Integrated Probabilistic Uncertainty Model
Here we propose an integrated treatment of both the types of epistemic uncertainty de-
scribed above, but with the additional assumption that interpretations of L may admit
truth-gaps i.e. that they correspond to valuation pairs. Let S denote the different possible
states of the world (or alternatively the set of possible worlds). A language convention c is
then viewed as a function which maps from states of the world to truth valuations on L.
Hence, in the current context, a language convention is a function c : S → V from states of
the world to valuation pairs. Let C denote the set of such conventions. Naturally, further
restrictions of this definition may then be considered such as c : S → Vs or c : S → Vk
depending on the class of valuation pairs considered as providing the appropriate form of
truth-model for L. For example, a convention c would be associated with a particular pair
of lower and upper thresholds ǫ ≤ ǫ on height for the concept short. Whereas a state of the
world σ ∈ S would be associated with a particular height value h for Ethel. The proposi-
tion ‘Ethel is short’ would then be absolutely true for those convention state pairs (c, σ)
for which h ≤ ǫ and not necessarily false in those for which h ≤ ǫ. From this perspective,
sentences of the language relate to the objective state of the world, but this relationship is
based on linguistic conventions which may be vague in the sense of admitting borderline
cases. Hence the truth (or falsity) of propositions depends on both the state of the world
and the linguistic conventions according to which the relevant concepts are defined relative
to the different possible states of the world S. A model of epistemic uncertainty integrat-
ing both the uncertainty types can therefore be defined in terms of a probability measure
P on subsets of the cross product space C × S of linguistic conventions with world states.
Such a model naturally generates a probability distribution on valuation pairs given by:
w(~v) = P ({(c, σ) : c(σ) = ~v})
From this we can naturally define lower and upper measures µ ≤ µ such that for θ ∈ SL,
µ(θ) is the probability of a valuation pair in which θ is absolutely true, while µ(θ) is the
probability of a valuation pair in which θ is not absolutely false. That is:
µ(θ) = w({~v : v(θ) = 1}) and µ(θ) = w({~v : v(θ) = 1})
This formulation would seem to have significant overlap with that of Lassiter [18], who has
proposed a model of linguistic vagueness defined on the cross-product space of possible
worlds with possible languages. However, Lassiter’s approach only refers to uncertainty
about ‘precise languages’ suggesting that he is assuming a classical underlying truth-model.
In this respect, his work is strongly related to probabilistic interpretations of fuzzy sets (see
[8] for an overview), in which a fuzzy concept is defined by a probability distribution on
possible crisp set definitions. On the other hand, we argue that a bipolar model combining
epistemic uncertainty with truth-gaps provides extra flexibility in decision making as well
as helping to explain why it may sometimes be optimal for an agent to choose to assert a
vague statement rather than a semantically similar crisp one. In section 5 we will expand
on this claim, however, initially we formally develop the notion of bipolar belief pairs.
4.2 Belief Pairs from Probability Distributions on Valuation Pairs
In this section we consider bipolar belief measures on SL as generated from probability
distributions defined on valuation pairs. The motivation for this approach comes from the
idea outlined in section 4.1 that epistemic uncertainty has both a semantic and stochastic
element, naturally resulting in probability distributions on valuation pairs when these pro-
vide the possible valuations of the language L. In particular, we will focus on Kleene and
supervaluation pairs and investigate some of the resulting bipolar uncertainty measures
on SL and their properties.
Definition 27. Supervaluation Belief Pair
Let w : Vs → [0, 1] be a probability distribution on Vs (i.e. the set of all supervaluation
pairs on L) then the Supervaluation Belief Pair (SBP) generated by w is a pair of lower
and upper measures ~µs,w = (µs,w, µs,w)
10 defined by: ∀θ ∈ SL
µ
s,w
(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vs : v(θ) = 1}) and µs,w(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vs : v(θ) = 1})
We refer to SBPs where w is non-zero only on Vbs as Bounded Supervaluation Belief
Pairs (BSBP) which are then denoted by ~µbs,w = (µbs,w, µbs,w). Similarly, BSBPs where w
is non-zero only on Vcbs are referred to as Complete Bounded Supervaluation Belief Pairs
(CBSBP) and denoted by ~µcbs,w = (µcbs,w, µcbs,w).
Notice that for SBPs we can define a mass function on sets of valuationsm : 22
P
→ [0, 1]
where m(∅) = 0 and
∑
P⊆2P m(P) = 1 such that ∀~v ∈ Vs,
m({Fαj : v(αj) = 1}) = w(~v)
Notice that in this case:
µ
s,w
(θ) =
∑
P⊆Pθ
m(P) and µs,w(θ) =
∑
P∩Pθ 6=∅
m(P)
Hence, µ
s,w
and µs,w are Dempster-Shafer belief and plausibility measures on SL respec-
tively [34]. Notice, in the case that w : Vs → [0, 1] is non-zero on {~v1, . . . , ~vr} and where
~vi is generated by the set of admissible valuations Pi which can be ordered such that
Pi ⊇ Pi+1 where i = 1, . . . , r−1, then µs,w and µs,w are necessity and possibility measures
respectively and hence: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL,
µ
s,w
(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ
s,w
(θ), µ
s,w
(ϕ)) and µs,w(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µs,w(θ), µs,w(ϕ))
10As with valuation pairs the notation ~µ = (µ, µ) refers to values of a lower and an upper belief measure
and not an interval of possible values for a single belief measure.
Notice from theorem 15 that µ
s,w
and µs,w are necessity and possibility measures exactly
when w is non-zero only on a set of supervaluation pairs which can be totally ordered
according to the semantic precision relation. In effect, in this case the agent’s uncertainty
is restricted to a lack of knowledge about exactly how semantically precise the correct
interpretation of L should be.
We now define belief pairs for the case when the underlying truth-model is that of
Kleene valuation pairs.
Definition 28. Kleene Belief Pair
Let w : Vk → [0, 1] be a probability distribution on Vk (i.e. the set of all Kleene valuation
pairs on L) then the Kleene Belief Pair (KBP) generated by w is a pair of lower and upper
measures ~µk,w = (µk,w, µk,w) defined by: ∀θ ∈ SL
µ
k,w
(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vk : v(θ) = 1}) and µk,w(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vk : v(θ) = 1})
Unsurprisingly, the properties of belief pairs are fundamentally constrained by the
properties of the underlying valuation pairs. For example, it follows immediately that
belief pairs which are defined in terms of valuation pairs satisfying VP1, including both
SBP and KBP, also satisfy duality in that ∀θ ∈ SL, µ(¬θ) = 1 − µ(θ), and vice-versa.
In the sequel we will investigate the properties of supervaluation belief pairs and Kleene
belief pairs in the light of the results given in section 3.2 relating Kleene and bounded
supervaluation pairs in the context of the semantic precision relation. Initially, however,
we propose an operational justification for the definition of belief pairs in terms of proba-
bility distributions on valuation pairs by introducing an extension of de Finetti’s betting
semantics for subjective probability.
4.3 Betting Semantics for Belief Pairs
Inspired by the operationalism movement in physics de Finetti [4] proposed betting be-
haviour as an operational semantics for subjective probability. In this section we employ
a generalisation of de Finetti’s result due to Paris [28] in order to give a betting interpre-
tation of belief pairs as defined in section 4.2. This will require a short initial digression
in order to outline de Finetti’s basic idea.
The motivation behind de Finetti’s approach was to provide a mechanism for eliciting
a number in [0, 1] quantifying an agent’s belief in a sentence θ by requiring them to decide
whether or not to accept a series of bets involving θ. It can then be shown that in
order for the agent to avoid situations of sure loss, referred to as Dutch books, an agent’s
quantitative beliefs must then conform to the axioms of probability theory. More formally,
we can identify a bet by triple (s, α, θ) where θ ∈ SL is the statement on which we are
betting, s ∈ R is the stake which can be either positive or negative, and α ∈ [0, 1] is the
odds. Accepting or buying this bet then means agreeing to the following terms:
• pay s× α
• for which you will receive £s if θ is true and receive £0 if θ is false.
Note that if s < 0 you are effectively selling the bet instead of buying it. Now supposing
that the classical valuation v ∈ Vc is representative of the true state of the world combined
with the correct language convention then the gain from bet (s, α, θ) is s(v(θ)−α). Conse-
quently, if language conventions are such that only classical valuation occur for any state
of the world then a Dutch book can be defined as a set of bets (si, αi, θi) : i = 1, . . . ,m
such that ∀v ∈ Vc,
∑m
i=1 si(v(θi)− αi) < 0.
Given this we are now able to define a rational agent as follows: Let µ : SL → [0, 1] be
a function representing an agent’s quantitative beliefs about the sentences of L. Suppose
µ is determined so that for all sentences θ, µ(θ) is the value for which the agent will accept
the bet (s, µ(θ), θ) for any stake s ∈ R i.e. µ(θ) represents the odds for which the agent
will bet on θ no matter what the value of the stake. In this case an agent will accept any
set of bets of the form (si, µ(θi), θi) : i = 1, . . . ,m and consequently it is desirable that
no such sequence should be a Dutch book. Hence, a rational agent is one for whom their
belief function µ is defined in such a way that no set of sentences of this form is a Dutch
book. de Finetti’s famous theorem shows that, according to this definition, an agent is
rational if and only if their belief is a probability measure on SL.
Now the above argument assumes that the underlying truth model is classical. We
now consider the consequences of allowing truth-gaps by assuming that the set of possible
truth models is a finite set of valuation pairs V′ ⊆ V which satisfy the duality principle
VP1. In this case it is natural to define both lower and upper bets where the lower bet
is dependent on the sentence involved being absolutely true while the upper bet requires
only that it is not absolutely false. Hence, let (s, α, θ)∗ denote the lower bet:
• pay s× α
• receive £s if θ is absolutely true and receive £0 if θ is not absolutely true
while (s, α, θ)∗ denotes the upper bet:
• pay s× α
• receive £s if θ is not absolutely false and receive £0 if θ is absolutely false
If ~v ∈ V′ is the valuation pair representing the true state of the world combined with the
correct language interpretation then the gain from (s, α, θ)∗ is s(v(θ) − α) while that of
(s, α, θ)∗ is s(v(θ) − α). An obvious consequence of this is that if s ≥ 0 then the gain
from (s, α, θ)∗ is always greater than or equal to that of (s, α, θ)∗ while if s < 0 then the
situation is reversed. Consequently a rational agent should always prefer to buy upper
bets and sell lower bets whenever possible. Furthermore, the duality property VP1 implies
a strong relationship between lower and upper bets as follows: Notice, that the gain for
lower bet (s, α,¬θ)∗ is s(v(¬θ)− α) = s(1− v(θ)− α) = −s(v(θ)− (1− α)) which is the
same as the gain for the upper bet (−s, 1 − α, θ)∗. Consequently, these two bets should
be viewed as equivalent since a rational agent should be willing to accept (s, α,¬θ)∗ if
and only if they are also willing to accept (−s, 1− α, θ)∗. In other words, for any stake a
rational agent should be equally willing to buy a lower bet on θ at a given odds and sell
an upper bet on ¬θ at one minus those odds, and vice-versa.
We now adopt an operational model in which an agent’s beliefs are quantified by a
belief pair ~µ where for any sentence θ, µ(θ) corresponds to the odds at which the agent is
prepared to accept the lower bet (s, α, θ)∗ for any stake s ∈ R, while µ(θ) is the odds at
which the agent will accept the upper bet (s, α, θ)∗ for any stake s ∈ R. Notice immediately
from the above duality argument that the two bets (s, µ(¬θ),¬θ)∗ and (−s, 1− µ(¬θ), θ)
are equally acceptable for any s ∈ R and hence µ(θ) = 1− µ(¬θ).
Now in this extended context a Dutch book is a combined set of lower and upper bets
(si, αi, θi)∗ : i = 1, . . . , r and (sj , αj , θj)
∗ : j = r + 1, . . . ,m for m ≥ r such that ∀~v ∈ V′,
r∑
i=1
si(v(θi)− αi) +
m∑
j=r+1
sj(v(θj)− αj) < 0
However, from the duality relationship described above we can restrict our attention
to Dutch books involving only lower bets since the set (si, αi, θi)∗ : i = 1, . . . , r and
(sj , αj , θj)
∗ : j = r+1, . . . ,m is a Dutch book if and only if the set (si, αi, θi)∗ : i = 1, . . . , r
and (−sj , 1− αj ,¬θj)∗ : j = r + 1, . . . ,m is a Dutch book.
Theorem 29. An agent is rational (in the sense of avoiding Dutch books comprised of
lower and upper bets) if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL,
µ(θ) = w({~v ∈ V′ : v(θ) = 1}) and µ(θ) = w({~v ∈ V′ : v(θ) = 1})
where w is a probability distribution on V′.
Proof. Paris [28] proved the following: Let B be a finite set of binary functions on SL.
Here we are assuming that B is the set of possible truth-models for L, so that if b ∈ B is the
true valuation then the gain from the bet (s, α, θ) is s(b(θ)− α). Also, let µ : SL → [0, 1]
denote the odds for which the bet (s, α, θ) is acceptable for all s ∈ R. Then there is no
set of bets (si, b(θi), θi) : i = 1, . . . ,m for which ∀b ∈ B,
m∑
i=1
si(b(θi)− µ(θi)) < 0
if and only if µ is a convex linear combinations of functions in B i.e. ∀θ ∈ SL, µ(θ) =
w({b ∈ B : b(θ) = 1}) where w is a probability distribution on B.
Now from the above we know that a belief pair ~µ avoids Dutch books involving lower
and upper bets if and only if the lower measure µ avoids Dutch books comprised only of
lower bets. Hence, the result follows immediately from Paris’ theorem by taking B = {v :
~v ∈ V′} and from the duality between µ and µ.
Clearly then theorem 29 provides an added justification for definitions 27 and 28 by
taking V′ = Vs and V
′ = Vk respectively. That is, if the underlying truth models of L are
supervaluation pairs or Kleene valuation pairs, then a rational agent should respectively
adopt supervaluation belief pairs or Kleene belief pairs as their subjective belief model in
order to avoid Dutch books comprised of sets of lower and upper bets.
4.4 Belief Pairs and Semantic Precision
We now investigate the properties of belief pairs relative to the semantic precision partial
ordering on valuation pairs. The aim is to highlight certain classes of belief pairs which
provide computationally efficient models under particularly restricted uncertainty condi-
tions. We begin by extending theorem 21 so as to show a natural relationship between
bounded supervaluation belief pairs and Kleene belief pairs.
Theorem 30. For any BSBP ~µbs,w there is a KBP ~µk,w′ such that ∀θ ∈ SL
+ ∪ SL−,
~µbs,w(θ) = ~µk,w′(θ) and ∀θ ∈ SL, µk,w′(θ) ≤ µbs,w(θ) and µk,w′(θ) ≥ µbs,w(θ).
Proof. By theorem 21 there exists a function g : Vbs → Vk such that g(~vbs) = ~vk where
vk(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F and vk(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F for F ⊆ F the lower and upper admissible
valuations of ~vbs and where ∀θ ∈ SL
+ ∪ SL−, and ∀~v ∈ Vbs, ~v and g(~v) agree on θ.
Now given BSBP ~µbs,w generated by probability distribution w on Vbs we define the
distribution w′ on Vk as follows
w′(~v′) = w({~v ∈ Vbs : g(~v) = ~v
′})
Then ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL− we have that:
µ
bs,w
(θ) = w({~v ∈ Vbs : v(θ) = 1}) = w({~v ∈ Vbs : g(~v) = ~v
′ and v′(θ) = 1})
= w′({~v′ ∈ Vk : v
′(θ) = 1}) = µ
k,w′
(θ)
The result follows similarly for µbs,w(θ).
Furthermore, from theorem 21 we have that if g(~v) = ~v′ then ~v′  ~v. Hence,
µ
k,w′
(θ) = w′({~v′ ∈ Vk : v
′(θ) = 1}) = w({~v ∈ Vbs : g(~v) = ~v
′, v′(θ) = 1})
≤ w({~v ∈ Vbs : v(θ) = 1}) = µbs,w(θ)
The proof that µk,w′(θ) ≥ µbs,w(θ) follows similarly.
For BSBP the following result identifies nestedness constraints on the set of valuation
pairs with non-zero probability, resulting in a belief pair which is truth-functional on SL+
and SL−.
Theorem 31. Let ~µbs,w be a BSBP where w is non-zero on the set of bounded superval-
uation pairs {~v1, . . . , ~vr} such that for ~vi and ~vj where i 6= j either Fi ⊆ F j or F j ⊆ F i
and either F i ⊆ F j or F j ⊆ F i. In this case: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL
+ and ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL−.
µ
bs,w
(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ
bs,w
(θ), µ
bs,w
(ϕ)) and µbs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µbs,w(θ), µbs,w(ϕ))
µ
bs,w
(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ
bs,w
(θ), µ
bs,w
(ϕ)) and µbs,w(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µbs,w(θ), µbs,w(ϕ))
Proof. Here we only prove the result for sentences in SL+. The result follows similarly
for sentences in SL−. Given the conditions of the theorem we can assume w.l.o.g. that
the set of bounded supervaluation pairs {~v1, . . . , ~vr} are ordered such that F 1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ F r.
Now by lemma 16 it holds that ∀θ ∈ SL+, vi(θ) = 1 if and only if vF i(θ) = 1. Also, by
lemma 16 it follows that if vF i(θ) = 1 then vF j (θ) = 1 for j = i+ 1, . . . , r. Hence, ∃t ≤ r
such that:
{~vi : vi(θ) = 1} = {~vt, . . . , ~vr}
Similarly, for ϕ ∈ SL+, ∃t′ ≤ r such that
{~vi : vi(ϕ) = 1} = {~vt′ , . . . , ~vr}
Hence, since from a basic property of supervaluation pairs vi(θ ∧ϕ) = min(vi(θ), vi(ϕ)) it
follows that
{~vi : vi(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1} = {~vmax(t,t′), . . . , ~vr}
Consequently,
µ
bs,w
(θ) =
r∑
j=t
w(~vj), µbs,w(ϕ) =
r∑
j=t′
w(~vj) and µbs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =
r∑
j=max(t,t′)
w(~vj)
= min(µ
bs,w
(θ), µ
bs,w
(ϕ))
Also, by theorem 20 it follows that vi(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(vi(θ), vi(ϕ)) and hence,
µ
bs,w
(θ ∨ ϕ) =
r∑
j=min(t,t′)
w(~vj) = max(µbs,w(θ), µbs,w(ϕ))
The required results for µbs,w can be proved in a similar manner since we can reorder the
relevant valuation pairs so that {~v1, . . . , ~vr} = {~v
′
1, . . . , ~v
′
r} where F
′
1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ F
′
r.
Corollary 32. Let ~µbs,w be a BSBP for which {~v ∈ Vbs : w(~v) > 0} = {~v1, . . . , ~vr} can be
ordered such that ~v1  ~v2  . . .  ~vr then the following holds:
∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, µ
bs,w
(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ
bs,w
(θ), µ
bs,w
(ϕ)) and
µbs,w(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µbs,w(θ), µbs,w(ϕ))
and
∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL+ and ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL−, µ
bs,w
(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ
bs,w
(θ), µ
bs,w
(ϕ)) and
µbs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µbs,w(θ), µbs,w(ϕ))
Proof. Since ~v1  . . .  ~vr it follows from theorem 15 that P1 ⊇ . . . ⊇ Pr. Hence µbs,w
and µbs,w are necessity and possibility measures on SL respectively. Also, it trivially holds
that F i ⊆ F i+1 and F i ⊇ F i+1 for i = 1, . . . , r − 1. The result then follows immediately
from theorem 31.
Corollary 32 identifies a special case of the conditions of theorem 31 for BSBPs gener-
ated from a probability distribution which is non-zero only on a set of valuation pairs that
can be totally ordered by the semantic precision relation. Recall from section 4.2 that in
this case a SBP corresponds to a necessity and possibility measure on SL. Combined with
theorem 31 this results in uncertainty measures that are partially functional in general,
and fully truth-functional on SL+ and SL−.
Corollary 32 has close parallels with a related result for KBP originally given in [23]
as follows:
Theorem 33. Let ~µk,w be a KBP for which {~v ∈ Vk : w(~v) > 0} = {~v1, . . . , ~vr} can be
ordered such that ~v1  ~v2  . . .  ~vr. In this case: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL
µ
k,w
(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ
k,w
(θ), µ
k,w
(ϕ)) and µk,w(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µk,w(θ), µk,w(ϕ))
µ
k,w
(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ
k,w
(θ), µ
k,w
(ϕ)) and µk,w(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µk,w(θ), µk,w(ϕ))
Theorem 33 is an even stronger result that corollary 32 in that for KBPs, if an agent’s
uncertainty concerns only the semantic precision of the correct interpretation of L, then
the resulting belief pair is fully truth-functional. Indeed, in such a case KBPs satisfy
the definition of lower and upper truth values (membership values) in interval fuzzy logic
(set theory) as proposed independently by Zadeh [43], Grattan-Guiness [13], Jahn [15]
and Sambuc [33]. Furthermore, given the isomorphic relationship between interval fuzzy
logic and Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy logic [1], theorem 33 also allows for an interpre-
tation of the latter in terms of KBPs. More specifically, we can interpret intuitionistic
fuzzy truth and falsity degrees in a sentence θ as corresponding to the probability that
θ is absolutely true and the probability that θ is absolutely false respectively, based on
an underlying truth-model of Kleene valuation pairs about which the only uncertainty
relates to semantic precision. In this case we can think of these measures as analogous
to necessity and possibility measures, but where the truth-model is that of Kleene rather
than supervaluation pairs.
5 Decision Making about Assertions
A fundamental challenge in natural language communications is to understand why we
often choose to make vague assertions when we have many potentially suitable crisp (se-
mantically precise) alternatives at our disposal. If the aim were simply to convey informa-
tion then we might suppose that the use of vague statements would only result in reduced
efficiency. Indeed some formal results in the game theoretic literature seem to support this
view [25]. However, van Deemter [39], [40] identifies a number of plausible reasons for the
utility of vagueness in natural language. In [39] a decision theoretic approach is proposed
according to which different utterances have different rewards or costs (negative rewards),
and where the choice of assertion in a particular context is driven by utility. Such an ap-
proach has similarities with the assertability risk models of Giles [11] and Kyburg [17]. In
this section we outline a very preliminary application of belief pairs to assertion decisions,
focusing on a class of communication scenarios referred to by van Deemter [39] as future
contingencies. Here we consider a communications model in which different agents have
different, and to some degree conflicting, goals and objectives. An agent is then required
to make a statement, perhaps in the form of a prediction or commitment, about some
future state of the world. While there are potential rewards for making such statements,
there may also be the risk of significant costs if they prove to be incorrect or if promises
are seen to be broken. In such scenarios, van Deemter argues, the utility of making a vague
assertion may be potentially higher than that for making a crisp assertion, primarily be-
cause the risk of incurring costs is significantly reduced. Future contingency scenarios
are important in many AI applications involving natural language generation (see [31] for
an overview) such as automatic weather forecast generation [12] or in automatic medical
diagnosis systems [29].
To illustrate the type of problems involved consider the example of a politician who is
considering making a pledge at an upcoming British General Election. She would like to
promise as high a reduction in the budget deficit as possible (achieved by cutting public
expenditure) resulting in as small an increase as possible in unemployment. She judges
that a promise of this kind would be popular with voters and would increase the probability
of her (or her political party) winning the election. One possibility would be to decide on
a crisp assertion and promise say ‘at least a 40% reduction in the deficit and no more than
a 2% increase in unemployment’. However, she may then be worried that she will find it
difficult to meet this commitment exactly and subsequently be punished by the voters at
the following election in five years time. If on the other hand she promises ‘a significant
reduction in the debt with only a minor increase in unemployment’ then she may still be
able to curry favour with the voters at the current general election while reducing the risk
of being accused of breaking promises at the subsequent election. To quote van Deemter
[39] ‘a precise promise is easier to break than a vague one’. The notion of valuation pairs
and truth-gaps may provide some insight into why this is indeed the case. The voters
in our example may interpret the politician as promising that their assertion will be
absolutely true by some future date, perhaps by the subsequent election, and reward them
accordingly. However, they will not then significantly punish them unless the assertion
turns out to be absolutely false. Hence, in future contingency scenarios the truth-gap
associated with a vague assertion provides the agent with a window of opportunity in which
they can maximize their chance of reward and minimize their risk of loss. Furthermore,
in practice almost all assertion decisions of this kind will be made in the presence of
significant epistemic uncertainty. Consequently, by combining a model of truth-gaps with
that of epistemic uncertainty, bipolar belief pairs may well provide a useful framework
for the analysis of future contingency and similar assertion decision scenarios. Indeed,
for the above example there is a clear need for an integrated model of this kind. Since
phrases such as ‘significant reduction’ and ‘minor increase’ are vague we would certainly
expect linguistic conventions to be based around truth-models which explicitly represent
borderline cases. For example, the truth valuation of the statement that there will be only
‘a minor increase in unemployment’ might be determined by lower and upper theresholds
on the overall percentage increase in unemployment, along the lines described in section
4.1 for the concept short. In addition, the inherent semantic uncertainty associated with
the interpretation of such natural language descriptions would mean that the politician
will be uncertain as to the exact nature of the language convention which should be applied
in this case. This semantic uncertainty could then manifest itself as uncertainty regarding
the values of the relevant lower and upper thresholds for phrases such as ‘minor increase
in unemployment’. Furthermore, since the politician is making a prediction about the
future, she will be uncertain as to what will be the actual state of the world. For example,
she will be unsure about what will be the actual percentage changes to unemployment and
to the deficit. The bipolar model outlined in section 4 would then allow the politician to
capture all these different aspects influencing the likely truth or falsity of their predictions
by lower and upper belief measures on the sentences concerned.
We now propose a simple utility decision model based on bipolar belief measures in
order to explore the potential advantages of asserting a vague sentence over a crisp one.
Suppose that, at time t0, an agent must choose between assertions θ and ϕ concerning
the state of the world at some future time t1, where ϕ is crisp and θ is vague. Assume
that the reward for making either assertion at time t0 is x > 0. At time t1 there will be a
further reward y > 0 if the assertion made at t0 is judged to be absolutely true given the
actual state of the world at t1. Similarly, there will be a cost −z (z > 0) if the assertion
made is judged to be absolutely false given the state of the world at t1. Furthermore, in
the case of vague assertion θ, there will be a small cost −w (0 ≤ w ≤ z) if θ is judged to
be a borderline statement at t1.
Now suppose that at time t0 the agents’ beliefs about the state of the world at t1 is
represented by a bipolar belief pair ~µ 11. Let Uθ and Uϕ denote the total rewards (which
may be negative) for making assertions θ and ϕ respectively. Then based on ~µ, the agent
can evaluate their expected reward for making either assertion θ or ϕ at time t0 as follows:
E(Uθ) = x+ µ(θ)y − µ(¬θ)z − (µ(θ)− µ(θ))w = x− z + µ(θ)(y + w) + µ(θ)(z − w)
E(Uϕ) = x+ µ(ϕ)y − µ(¬ϕ)z = x− z + µ(ϕ)(y + z)
where, since ϕ is a crisp statement, µ(ϕ) = µ(ϕ) = µ(ϕ). Given this formulation we can
now investigate under what circumstances the agent would expect a higher reward for
asserting the vague statement θ than for asserting the precise statement ϕ. Initially, we
make the simplifying assumption that θ being a borderline case is effectively cost neutral
so that w = 0. Furthermore, we assume that θ is selected such that µ(θ) < µ(ϕ) < µ(θ)
12. Now let α = y
z
be the ratio of the reward for the assertion being absolutely true at t1
against the cost of the assertion be absolutely false at t1. Then we have that:
E(Uθ) ≥ E(Uϕ) if and only if α ≤
µ(θ)− µ(ϕ)
µ(ϕ)− µ(θ)
Hence, we have an upper bound on the ratio of reward y over cost z for which E(Uθ) ≥
E(Uϕ), so that the higher the cost of making an assertion which is absolutely false at t1
relative to the reward of making an assertion which is absolutely true at t1, the more likely
it is that the agent will be better off choosing a vague over a crisp assertion. In addition,
as the belief value of ϕ approaches to the lower belief value for θ then there is an increasing
range of ratio values for which the agent will be better off choosing the vague over the
crisp assertion. Furthermore, notice that if µ(ϕ) ≤
µ(θ)+µ(θ)
2 then E(Uθ) ≥ E(Uϕ) for all
α ∈ [0, 1] (i.e. for all cases where y ≤ z). A particular instance of this is when ~µ(θ) = (0, 1)
and µ(ϕ) ≤ 0.5 and hence, if the cost of making an assertion which is absolutely false at
t1 is higher than the reward for making an assertion which is absolutely true at t1, then a
rational agent should choose a statement which they are certain is borderline over a crisp
statement for which their belief value is at most 0.5.
11For this analysis it is not important whether ~µ is a SBP or a KBP
12A justification of this assumption is as follows: Suppose that θ is selected by the agent so that it is
a less semantically precise statement than ϕ. Then in the framework of valuation pairs this would mean
the following: If ~µ is generated by probability distribution w where {~v : w(~v) > 0} = {~v1, . . . , ~vr} then
since ϕ is crisp vi(ϕ) = vi(ϕ) = vi(ϕ) for i = 1, . . . , r and since θ is less semantically precise than ϕ then
vi(θ) ≤ vi(ϕ) ≤ vi(θ) for i = 1, . . . , r, where in some cases these inequalities are strict. From this it follows
immediately that µ(θ) < µ(θ) < µ(θ).
These result must, of course, be understood in the light of the modelling assumption
we have made. In particular, we have assumed that there are the same rewards and costs,
x, y and z, for both crisp and vague assertions. We might perhaps justify this assumption
by supposing that the two assertions are sufficiently semantically similar that there would
be no distinction made between them in the allocation of rewards and costs. However,
it is equally possible that other agents may prefer crisp assertions over vague ones. For
example, voters may be more likely to vote for a politician who makes crisp promises
because such assertions are easier to evaluate at a future date than similar but vague
commitments. One way of modelling this would be to suppose different rewards x1 and
x2 for asserting θ and ϕ at t0 respectively, and where x2 ≥ x1. In this case the expected
utilities from asserting θ and ϕ are given by:
E(Uθ) = x1 − z + µ(θ)(y + w) + µ(θ)(z − w) and E(Uϕ) = x2 − z + µ(ϕ)(y + z)
From this we obtain that E(Uθ) ≥ E(Uϕ) if and only if α ≤
µ(θ)−µ(ϕ)−β
µ(ϕ)−µ(θ) and β ≤ µ(θ)−µ(ϕ)
where β = x2−x1
z
is the ratio of the difference between the two rewards at t0 over the cost
at t1 of making an absolutely false assertion. Consequently, the larger the cost of making
an absolutely false assertion relative to the different rewards x1, x2 and y, the more likely
it is that the agent will be better off making a vague rather than a crisp assertion.
The above is of course a highly simplified analysis with many assumptions which
are probably unrealistic. Despite these limitations we nonetheless suggest that it does
take some small steps towards demonstrating the potential applicability of the bipolar
belief framework for modelling decision problems involving the choice of vague over crisp
assertions. A decision theoretic analysis of this kind could have significant applications in
Artificial Intelligence. Indeed, some natural language generation systems already include
the use of vague words. For example, the weather forecasting system FOG developed by
Goldberg et al. [12] includes terms such as westerly or southerly to describe wind direction.
A more developed analysis along the lines of that outline above, raises the possibility of
providing such systems with the capability of choosing between vague and crisp assertions
on the basis of a range of factors including context and uncertainty levels.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced valuation pairs as a truth-model which captures border-
line cases relating to vague propositional statements. Different classes of valuation pairs
have been discussed and the relationships between them have been investigated. In par-
ticular, we have provided axiomatic characterisations of supervaluation pairs and Kleene
valuation pairs. Furthermore, we have exposed the close relationship between Kleene
valuation pairs and bounded supervaluation pairs.
We have then proposed an integrated approach to truth-gaps and epistemic uncertainty
in the form of lower and upper belief measures on the sentences of the language. In this
context the lower measure of a sentence θ is the probability that θ is absolutely true, while
the upper measure is the probability that θ is not absolutely false. The definition of these
two measures in terms of an underlying probability distribution on valuation pairs can
be justified by assuming that the truth-model for the language is functionally dependent
on both the state of the world and conventions for language use, and where epistemic
uncertainty is modelled by a probability distribution on world state and language conven-
tion pairs. Further justification is provided by a betting argument according to which a
rational agent must define their lower and upper measures so as avoid accepting Dutch
books consisting of sets of lower and upper bets. Within this bipolar belief framework we
have outlined a possible decision theoretic argument as to why, in some circumstances, it
might be optimal for an agent to choose to assert a vague statement over a crisp one when
making forecasts or promises relating to some future state of the world about which they
are uncertain.
The model of truth-gaps provided by valuation pairs assumes that the notions of ab-
solutely true and absolutely false are primitives and consequently our framework lacks
some the expressiveness of other approaches especially with regard to higher order vague-
ness. For example, many formalisations of supervaluationism are based on modal logic
(e.g. Bennett [2]) and which therefore allow the explicit representation of higher order
statements such as ‘absolutely true θ’ and ‘borderline true that absolutely true θ’ etc. In-
deed, the importance of capturing higher-order borderline cases in this manner is largely
taken for granted by theorists of vagueness. However, we argue that there are a number of
justifications for a more straightforward approach which avoids representing higher-order
statements as part of the language.
From a practical perspective the valuation pair framework is sufficiently general to
encompass a range of different theoretical approaches to truth-gaps. This enables direct
comparisons between, for instance, supervaluationism and three-valued logic of the kind we
have outlined in this paper. Furthermore, the valuation pair approach can be naturally
extended so as to provide an integrated model of truth-gaps and epistemic uncertainty
based on lower and upper measures as described in section 4. From a more theoretical
perspective we argue that the idea of higher-order truth-gaps is actually quite problematic
and that it is far from clear that valuations of the form borderline true that absolutely true
are even meaningful. Consider, for example, the concept of short as defined on the scale
of heights. Suppose that instead of the two threshold values ǫ and ǫ suggested in section
4.1, we have a series of increasing thresholds representing borderline cases, borderline
borderline cases and so on. The problem with this interpretation of the concept is that,
as pointed out by Sainsbury [32], it naturally collapses to the original two-borderline
case. This is because, given the original intuition behind borderline cases as being those
which are neither absolutely true nor absolutely false, we must be able to partition the
set of heights as follows: There is a set of lower heights to which the concept short is
absolutely and totally applicable. Similarly, there is an upper set of heights to which short
is absolutely and totally not applicable. The union of all other sets of heights, no matter
what level of borderline they constitute, can simply be viewed as a type of borderline i.e.
heights which for which short is neither absolutely applicable nor absolutely not applicable.
Another perspective on this is given by Raffman [30] who suggests that second order
statement such as ‘absolutely true θ’ and ‘absolutely false θ’ simply do not admit truth-
gaps. In other words, such statements admit only a binary truth-model. Indeed, Raffman
argues, that given our intuitive understanding of ‘absolutely true θ’ and ‘absolutely false
θ’ as meaning that θ is unquestionably true or unquestionably false respectively, then a
statement such as ‘borderline absolutely true θ’ can have no other truth value but false. Of
course, none of this means that an agent may not be uncertain as to the exact boundaries
of a concept. However, we would argue that this is a form of semantic uncertainty about
the conventions of language use and consequently should be modelled probabilistically as
described in section 4, rather than being incorporated into the underlying truth-model by
means of modal operators.
It is certainly the case that a purely propositional framework, as described in this
paper, has definite limitations. Future work should therefore explore extending these ideas
to predicate logic. One initial approach might be to develop random set and prototype
theory models of the kind introduced in [20], so as to incorporate both lower and upper
threshold distances from prototypes. The idea here is that the interpretation of a predicate
R would be defined by a set of prototypes PR in some underlying metric space, together
with lower and upper thresholds, ǫ and ǫ, on the distance of elements from PR. For an
element of the space x with distance less than ǫ from PR, R(x) would be absolutely true,
while for an element x with distance from PR greater than ǫ, R(x) would be absolutely
false. All other elements would then be borderline cases of R. Semantic uncertainty about
the exact values of ǫ and ǫ could then be modelled by a joint probability distribution on
the two thresholds. An elementary model of this kind has already been proposed in [21]
and in [38], but there is scope to develop a much more general version of this prototype
theory based framework to capture borderline cases and semantic uncertainty in predicate
definitions.
As we have already indicated in section 5 the bipolar framework outlined in this paper
has potential application to natural language generation systems. Other areas of Artificial
Intelligence where our approach may have applications include consensus modelling and
multi-agent dialogues. For the former, truth-gaps may provide a means by which an agent
can adapt their beliefs so as to reach consensus with other agents whilst maintaining a
certain level of internal consistency. Indeed truth-gaps are fundamental here, in allowing
for a weaker notion of consistency according to which different valuations may still be
considered consistent. Furthermore, consensus modelling provides an example of an appli-
cation in which the interests of different agents are more or less aligned. More specifically,
agents share a common goal of, where possible, reaching a consensus about their beliefs. In
multi-agent dialogues, lower and upper valuations can provide a model of strong and weak
assertions, with semantic precision providing a structured criterion according to which
different viewpoints can be clustered together. Preliminary studies have been carried out
in both application areas for Kleene valuation pairs (see [24] and [22]). There are plans to
extend these to more in depth studies, including developing the proposed methods within
the general valuation pairs framework.
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